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INTRODUCTION
ver the past two and a half years, the international tax
community has focused on the Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting Project (BEPS project) undertaken by the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) at the be-
hest of the G20. The mission of the project, as its title suggests,
is to address the substantive and procedural tax rules that have
enabled taxpayers, particularly large multinational businesses,
to pursue transactions and strategies that have effectively
eroded tax bases and shifted profits to low- or no-tax jurisdic-
tions. In October 2015 the OECD delivered its BEPS package of
sixteen reports and related recommendations to the G20 for ap-
proval. According to the OECD, the subsequent analysis and
agreement involved the direct participation of more than sixty
countries.1 An additional fifty-nine countries indirectly partici-
pated through regional dialogues.2 Furthermore, numerous in-
ternational organizations are credited with participating in dis-
cussions and contributing to the resulting product.3 According to
the OECD, the next step is to design and implement an “inclu-
sive framework for monitoring BEPS and [for] supporting imple-
mentation of the measures, with all interested countries and ju-
risdictions invited to participate on an equal footing.”4 In early
2016 the OECD announced the framework that will allow the
1. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], EXPLANATORY
STATEMENT: 2015 FINAL REPORTS 4 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-ex-
planatory-statement-2015.pdf.
2. In two rounds of meetings in 2015 and early 2016, fifty-nine countries
participated in Regional Network meetings, offering input for the BEPS pro-
ject. Id. at 4–5.
3. Participating organizations included the African Tax Administration
Forum, Centre de recontre des administrations fiscales, Centro Interameri-
cano de Administraciones Tributarias, International Monetary Fund (IMF),
World Bank, and the United Nations. Id.
4. OECD Presents Outputs of OECD/G20 BEPS Project for Discussion at
G20 Finance Ministers Meeting, OECD.ORG (Oct. 5, 2015),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/oecd-presents-outputs-of-oecd-g20-beps-project-for-
discussion-at-g20-finance-ministers-meeting.htm.
O
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equal participation of all countries in the BEPS implementation
process.5
Over the past three years, significant energy and resources
have been channeled toward achieving international consensus
on the nature of major international tax problems and on reform
responses. Examples of international tax cooperation certainly
predate the BEPS project, as do scholarly examinations of such
cooperation.6 But, the scale and scope of international engage-
ment in the BEPS project presents a unique opportunity to eval-
uate international cooperation.7 Nonetheless, the BEPS project’s
5. See Implementing the BEPS Package: Building an Inclusive Framework,
OECD.ORG (Feb. 2016), https://www.oecd.org/tax/flyer-implementing-the-beps-
package-building-an-inclusive-framework.pdf; see also All Interested Countries
and Jurisdictions to be Invited to Join Global Efforts Led by the OECD and
G20 to Close International Tax Loopholes, OECD.ORG (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/all-interested-countries-and-jurisdictions-to-be-in-
vited-to-join-global-efforts-led-by-the-oecd-and-g20-to-close-international-tax-
loopholes.htm; Kevin Bell, OECD Invites All Countries to Implement BEPS
Measures, Int’l Tax News (BNA) (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.bna.com/oecd-in-
vites-countries-m57982067630/.
6. Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 939, 1
(2000); Tsilly Dagan, Dilemmas of Tax Policy in a Globalized World, SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (Nov. 11, 2001), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1957945; Antonio Hugo Figueroa, Tratados tributarios
para evitar la doble imposición internacional o para transferir recursos de
países en desarrollo a países desarrollados [Tax Treaties to Avoid Double Inter-
national Taxation or Transfer of Resources from Developing to Developed Coun-
tries], VOCES EN EL FENIX, May 2012, at 128.
7. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 74–75
(2014) (describing character and source rules as a “major bone of controversy
between developing countries and the OECD”); Arthur J. Cockfield, BEPS and
Global Digital Taxation, 75 TAXNOTES INT’L 933, 933–40 (2014); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Pub. Law &
Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 493, 2016), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2716125; Adam H. Rosenzweig, Building a Framework for a Post-BEPS
World, 74 TAX NOTES INT’L 1, 1–7 (2014); Jung-hong Kim, A New Age of Multi-
lateralism in International Taxation?, 21 SEOUL TAX L. REV. 227 (2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2733964; Dirk Maarten Broekhuijsen & Henk Vord-
ing, The Multilateral Tax Instrument: How to Avoid a Stalemate on Distribu-
tional Issues?, 2016 BRITISH TAX REV. 39, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2745229;
Baitshepi Tebogo, The Transfer Pricing Problem: When Multinational Corpo-
rations Shift Profits Across International Borders, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
NETWORK 1 (July 30, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1899014; Tsilly Dagan,
Community Obligations in International Taxation, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
NETWORK (Feb. 23, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2736923; Yariv Brauner, Treaties in the Aftermath of BEPS, 41
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stated mission will not be achieved exclusively through the in-
ternational agreement evidenced in the final reports and recom-
mendations released in 2015. Effective implementation of the
BEPS package approved by the G20 in 2015 requires domestic
action of various types—the domestic side of international agree-
ment.8
Execution of the BEPS recommendations relies on those
measures being implemented “through domestic law changes,
including [but not limited to] strengthened rules on Controlled
BROOK. J. INT’LL. 973 (2016); Itai Grinberg, Breaking BEPS: The New Interna-
tional Tax Diplomacy (Georgetown Univ. Law Center, 2015), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2652894; Hugh J. Ault, Some Re-
flections on the OECD and the Sources of International Tax Principles, 70 TAX
NOTES INT’L (2013); Hugh J. Ault, Wolfgang Schoen, & Stephen E. Shay, Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Roadmap for Reform, 68 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 275
(2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2459646; Michael Lang & Jeffrey Owens, The
Role of Tax Treaties in Facilitating Development and Protecting the Tax Base
(WU Int’l Taxation Research Paper Series, No. 2014-03, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2398438; Orly Mazur, Transfer Pricing Challenges in
the Cloud, 57 B.C. L. REV. 643 (recommending that, given the features of a new
business environment driven by Cloud computing and virtual information stor-
age, an international tax reform solution that adopts formulary apportionment
or the profit-split methodology on a coordinated global basis would better ad-
dress BEPS andminimize the undesirable policy results of our current transfer
pricing rules); Andres Baez & Yariv Brauner,Withholding Taxes in the Service
of BEPS Action 1: Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (WU Int’l
Taxation Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2015-14, 2015), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2591830. Economic analysis offers insights into particular base erosion
problems and the potential for action. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Clausing, The Ef-
fect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base in the United States and Be-
yond (June 17, 2016) (unpublished paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2685442
(estimating the effect of profit shifting on corporate tax base erosion for the
United States and the sensitivity of foreign incomes to tax burdens for major
foreign direct investment destinations, and considering extension of this anal-
ysis to other countries).
8. H. David Rosenbloom & Joseph P. Brothers, Reflections on the Intersec-
tion of U.S. Tax Treaty Policy, U.S. Tax Reform, and BEPS, 78 TAXNOTES INT’L
759–69 (2015) (“The stated goal of BEPS is a coordinated effort to reduce cor-
porate tax avoidance. The real-world effect, however, is more likely to be seen
in the efforts of individual countries to impose a greater tax burden on inbound
investment. Coordination of the BEPS actions seems unlikely in a world with
hugely disparate views of the function of an income tax. The more foreseeable
result is a cacophony of new rules, predicated on BEPS and tempered only by
the views of individual countries regarding adverse impacts on the inflow of
capital.”).
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Foreign Corporations, a common approach to limiting base ero-
sion through interest deductibility and new rules to prevent hy-
brid mismatch arrangements from making profits disappear for
tax purposes through the use of complex financial instruments.”9
In addition to such purely domestic law steps, the BEPS project
requires rapid incorporation of BEPS concepts into the vast
number of bilateral tax treaties. Traditionally, the treaty process
entails bilateral renegotiation and domestic ratification on a
treaty-by-treaty basis. To bypass this cumbersome process, the
OECD introduced a multilateral instrument (available for coun-
tries’ signatures in 2016) that is designed to facilitate the incor-
poration of BEPS treaty-related measures into existing bilateral
treaties.10 Thus, while the BEPS final package represents a level
of global engagement and agreement,11 crucial steps must be
taken at the domestic level to ensure any real effectiveness for
the BEPS project.
This article makes three points regarding the pivotal domestic
side of international tax agreements—including the BEPS pro-
ject. First, domestic-level compliance cannot be presumed
simply from the existence of some degree of international agree-
ment. Even if states reach an understanding regarding some
facet of an international tax problem, an “agreement” by states
is not the end game. Instead, the true goal is full implementation
9. OECD Presents Outputs of OECD/G20 BEPS Project for Discussion at
G20 Finance Ministers Meeting, supra note 4.
10. Id.
11. For purposes of this article, it is acknowledged that the BEPS project
has achieved notable global participation and agreement. That said, there are
significant critiques of the OECD and the work of the BEPS project. Some con-
tend that the project is not aggressive enough in combatting avoidance and
profit shifting and that the resulting measures are too diluted to be significant.
See, e.g., Eva Eberhartinger &Matthias Petutschnig, Practicing Experts’ Views
on BEPS: A Critical Analysis (WU Int’l Taxation Research Paper Series, Paper
No. 2015-27, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2683552; Dhammika Dhar-
mapala, What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review
of the Empirical Literature (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. For Law & Econ.,
Research Paper No. 702, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2373549 (arguing
through different empirical approaches for identifying income shifting that the
estimated magnitude of BEPS is typically much smaller than that found in
earlier studies). Others have questioned developed countries’ use of power to
shape the terms of the international tax system. See, e.g., Allison Christians,
Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation, 25 WIS. INT’LL.J. 325 (2007);
Allison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation, and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J. OF
INT’L L. 99 (2009).
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of any and all steps necessary to bring that agreement into full
effect. The question, then, is why is international agreement not
necessarily sufficient?
The answer is the power and role of the domestic side of the
nation-state. Although states must act and negotiate as mono-
liths in their state-to-state interactions,12 there remains the
ever-present constraint of democracy at home and the possibility
that a deal struck on the global stage will be undone in the do-
mestic sphere. This dynamic between international relations
and domestic “politics” is neither new nor limited to taxation.
The ongoing U.S. failure in tax treaty ratification, however, pro-
vides a fascinating case study of one significant domestic derail-
ment of international agreement. Given the heightened expecta-
tions regarding cooperation among nations in the BEPS pro-
ject,13 adequate attention should be directed to the domestic side
of cooperation.
12. For example, as the OECD continues to pursue the BEPS project, both
in its initial formulations and in future applications, the United States must
present a single U.S. position on the questions. But, to the extent progress on
the BEPS issues is premised on a measure of agreement among the participat-
ing states and anticipates corresponding cooperation, the real success of inter-
national agreement remains contingent on domestic support. Of course, the
complexities are even richer than simply the addition of domestic compliance
to the international cooperation story. At the earlier state-to-state level of ne-
gotiation, even though countries formally adopt positions as a single actor, the
reality of competing views domestically remains likely. The existence of com-
peting positions percolating within the jurisdiction can be evidenced by the ar-
ray of non-state actors seeking to influence the discussion (including, for ex-
ample, trade and industry organizations, multinationals, and nongovernmen-
tal agencies).
13. See OECD, supra note 1 (highlighting goals of the BEPS project to in-
clude the “urgent need to restore the trust of ordinary people in the fairness of
their tax systems, to level the playing field among businesses, and to provide
governments with more efficient tools to ensure the effectiveness of their sov-
ereign tax policies.”). But, the BEPS project is also seen as a way to preempt a
multitude of potentially conflicting domestic steps. Id. (“It was also imperative
to move quickly to try to limit the risks of countries taking uncoordinated uni-
lateral measures which might weaken key international tax principles which
form a stable framework for cross-border investments.”). Moreover, the pro-
ject’s structure and goals, by their very design, require widespread cooperation.
Id. (“The G20 and the OECD have recognised that BEPS by its very nature
requires coordinated responses, which is why countries have invested the re-
sources to participate in the development of shared solutions.”). The G20 has
supported the group effort of the OECD in the base erosion work. See, e.g.,
Group of Twenty [G-20], Los Cabos Summit Leaders’ Declaration ¶ 48 (June
2016] When International Agreements Fail At Home 1191
Second, the reasons why international agreements may be sty-
mied on the domestic front vary greatly, but can include: (1) a
conflict in goals between the branch of government responsible
for negotiating with other states and the branch(es) involved in
the process of domestic implementation; (2) a state’s decision to
only nominally accept an emerging global rule or practice; (3) a
change in political parties between the international negotiation
phase and the completion of the required domestic steps; (4) the
use of procedural techniques by a political minority to forestall
domestic implementation; and (5) the inability of international
agreements crafted by technical experts to gain broader political
traction and support in the domestic arena. Study of interna-
tional tax relations (i.e., the intersection between international
relations theory and practice and international tax) may provide
a better understanding of the origins and nature of any gap be-
tween a nation’s international position on a tax issue and the
domestic view of that same problem.
Third, the BEPS project—which contains multiple issues,
types of commitments, and players—presents numerous dimen-
sions on which strategic conduct can be pursued. The two-level
game theory model of international relations, which formalizes
the observation that a state must secure international agree-
ment with global actors (level one of the game) and must secure
domestic agreement to the international commitment (level two
of the game), becomes quite intricate when played with so many
moving pieces. One possibility is that states have become sophis-
ticated players of this two-level game in the BEPS project. For
example, perhaps states have been willing to make general,
18–19 2012), https://g20.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/G20_Leaders_Dec-
laration_Final_Los_Cabos_0.pdf (expressing the “need to prevent base erosion
and profit shifting” and voicing support for the work being done in that area
by the OECD). The U.S. Treasury Secretary reiterated the emphasis on coor-
dinated rather than unilateral action. Press Release, Statement by Treasury
Secretary Jacob J. Lew at the G-20/OECD BEPS Press Conference (Oct. 9,
2015), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0204.aspx
(noting the acceptance of deliverables from the BEPS project and underscoring
the “wide agreement that these recommendations should be successful when
implemented in cooperation, and that countries should avoid unilateral action
inconsistent with the process.”). For more on the U.S. perspective, see STAFF
OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., JCX-139-15, BACKGROUND,
SUMMARY, AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT
SHIFTING PROJECT (Comm. Print 2015).
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global commitments on the expectation that not all commit-
ments with all actors will be executed with equal robustness at
the domestic level.
Fortunately, to date, international tax policy analysis provides
a good foundation for exploring, assessing, and evaluating the
effects of the domestic politics of a democracy on developments
in tax policy. In recent years, the tax literature has begun the
task of evaluating international tax policy formation through the
insights, questions, and analytical frameworks offered by the
broader international relations literature.14 International tax
topics explored through this lens include: the development of
global fiscal transparency norms;15 the contest between auto-
matic information reporting and anonymous withholding;16 co-
operative non-treaty mechanisms to resolve collective action
problems in international tax;17 sovereignty in international tax
14. See, e.g., Diane Ring, International Tax Relations: Theory and Implica-
tions, 60 TAX L. REV. 83 (2007); Paul R. McDaniel, The David R. Tillinghast
Lecture Trade Agreements and Income Taxation: Interactions, Conflicts, and
Resolutions, 57 TAX L. REV. 275 (2004); Eduardo A. Baistrocchi, The Interna-
tional Tax Regime and the BRIC World: Elements for a Theory, 33 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 733 (2013); Joshua Aizenman & Yothin Jinjarak, The Collection
Efficiency of the Value Added Tax: Theory and International Evidence (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research,Working Paper No. 11539, 2005), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=779949; Michael J. Graetz, Can a 20th Century Business Income Tax
Regime Serve a 21st Century Economy? 30 AUSTL. TAX F. 551 (2015).
15. See, e.g., Lisa Philipps & Miranda Stewart, Fiscal Transparency: Global
Norms, Domestic Laws, and the Politics of Budgets, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 797
(2009); ALASDAIR S. ROBERTS, GLOB. INITIATIVE FOR FISCAL TRANSPARENCY,
PROMOTING FISCAL OPENNESS (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2608967; Lisa
Philipps, The Globalization of Tax Expenditure Reporting: Transplanting
Transparency in India and the Global South (Osgoode Hall Law Sch. Compar-
ative Research in Law & Political Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Pa-
per No. 43/2012, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2156484&download=yes.
16. See, e.g., Itai Grinberg, The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60
UCLA L. REV. 304 (2012).
17. See, e.g., Adam H. Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty, 2012
WIS. L. REV. 717 (2012); Laura Friedlander & Scott Wilkie, Policy Forum: The
History of Tax Treaty Provisions—And Why it is Important to Know About it,
54 CANADIAN TAX J. 907 (2006) (detailing the vast amount of inaccessible prec-
edent and history regarding the intent and application of tax treaties and the
subsequent difficulty in relying upon tax treaties for modern tax policy).
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policy;18 identity and impact of key actors in creating interna-
tional tax policy;19 and “sharing” among nations.20
The task of this article is to explore how domestic politics can
impact the heart of the international tax system—the agree-
ments among nation-states on important issues of tax policy de-
sign and practice. This inquiry is not a normative question of if
and when international tax cooperation is appropriate or desir-
able. Rather, it is a positive question of how agreements transi-
tion from the global arena to the domestic sphere successfully or
unsuccessfully.
Emphasizing the reality of domestic derailments of interna-
tional tax agreements, Part I introduces the prominent and re-
cent U.S. domestic failure to secure ratification of U.S. tax trea-
ties. The story is outlined in some detail to provide a rich sense
of the complicated political forces at play on the domestic side
when bilateral tax treaties are signed. Although the precise se-
quence of events, motivations, and constraints are context spe-
cific, the message regarding the potential for a gap between a
nation’s asserted position on the international stage and its ca-
pacity to execute at home resonates more broadly. The BEPS
project, which contains a variety of international agreements
and commitments, provides ample opportunity for domestic-in-
ternational gaps and discords to emerge.
Part II provides a preliminary review of the international re-
lations literature regarding international cooperation, which
provides valuable insights for building a model of domestic poli-
tics in international tax. Although the international relations lit-
erature has directed some attention to taxation in recent years,
there remains significant work to be done in translating core
theoretical ideas from the general literature (and from the case
studies in defense, human rights, and trade) to the tax context.
18. See, e.g., Diane M. Ring, Democracy, Sovereignty & Tax Competition:
The Role of Tax Sovereignty in Shaping Tax Cooperation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 555
(2009).
19. See, e.g., Diane M. Ring, Who is Making International Tax Policy?: In-
ternational Organizations as Power Players in a High Stakes World, 33
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 649 (2010).
20. See, e.g., Allison Christians, How Nations Share, 87 IND. L.J. 1407
(2012); Allison Christians, Global Trends and Constraints on Tax Policy in the
Least Developed Countries, 42 U.B.C. L. REV. 239 (2010).
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Part III looks to some of the theoretical work reviewed in Part
II to offer preliminary thoughts on a framework for understand-
ing the intersection of international tax and domestic politics. In
light of the increasing role that global cooperation and coordina-
tion play in the development of successful international tax pol-
icy and practice, the article concludes by considering the next
research steps that could illuminate the domestic side of inter-
national agreements.
I. CASE STUDY OFDOMESTIC CHALLENGES TO
INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION
This Part introduces a U.S. case study in order to launch a
conversation about, and an examination of, the domestic side of
international taxation. To gain a solid understanding of the full
forces at work, it will be important to develop a body of interna-
tional tax case studies across different jurisdictions. In that un-
dertaking, it will be critical to envision the relationship between
the domestic and the global spheres as interactive and dynamic.
The two spheres are not entirely separate, nor is their relation-
ship linear, one-directional, or episodic. In fact, one could ob-
serve that there could be no “national position” to bring to the
international negotiating table without first having developed
some sense of an issue domestically. Despite the iterative dimen-
sion of the interaction between these spheres, it is useful to ex-
amine an important and definitive way in which they can col-
lide—when an international agreement “returns” home and is
challenged, blocked, or rejected. Thus, this case study identifies
an international agreement—here tax treaties—that faced re-
sistance domestically. This article draws attention to a signifi-
cant U.S. example in order to provide a starting point to assess
the level of detail and the array of relevant actors engaged in
such stories.
A. U.S. Tax Treaties and Domestic Ratification
The U.S. treaty formation and ratification process provides
one illustration of the dynamic between the domestic political
sphere and international tax relations. U.S. treaties are negoti-
ated and signed by the executive branch of the government. The
signed treaty is then submitted to the Senate for “advice and
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consent.”21 After the Senate approves the treaty (through a two-
thirds majority of Senators present), the president exchanges
signed ratification instruments with the treaty partner, thereby
bringing the treaty into force. The U.S. House of Representatives
(the “House”) plays no role in the process, despite the fact that
under the U.S. Constitution the House is the designated body for
originating “all bills for raising Revenue.”22 U.S. tax treaties do
not have to be incorporated into domestic law23 to have the force
of law. Instead, tax treaty provisions in the United States are
generally considered to be “self-executing,” meaning no further
legislation is required to implement the treaty terms. IRC §
894(a),24 which states that the tax code shall be applied “with
due regard to any treaty obligation of the United States,” can be
interpreted as granting legislative effect to tax treaties.25
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Advice & Consent, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/general/Features/Treaties_display.htm (last visited
May 31, 2016).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. Tax treaties, however, do not increase the
burden on taxpayers relative to U.S. domestic tax law, and taxpayers can elect
to decline the benefits of tax treaties. Taxpayers, though, are limited in their
ability to apply provisions of a relevant treaty selectively.
23. “Dualist” is the term often used to describe countries where treaties do
not automatically operate in domestic law and “monist” for countries where
they do automatically operate.
24. 26 U.S.C.A. § 894 (West 2016). I.R.C. § 894 itself is domestic law passed
according to Constitutional provisions regarding the role of the House of Rep-
resentatives in passing tax legislation.
25. Unlike the legal relationship between treaties and domestic statutes in
many countries, U.S. domestic legislation can override treaties. Article VI,
clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[l]aws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme
Law of the Land.” According to the U.S. Supreme Court, this language means
that statutes and treaties are of equal standing. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957). In the event of a conflict between a domestic statute and a treaty, the
Supreme Court has held that the later-in-time rule prevails (i.e., whichever
treaty or statute is adopted or enacted later will prevail). See Whitney v. Rob-
ertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the
same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are
declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior
efficacy is given to either over the other. . . . If the two are inconsistent, the one
last in date will control the other . . . .”). Courts, however, will seek to harmo-
nize the language of potentially conflicting treaties and statutes where possi-
ble, and will try to reserve the finding of a conflict (and thus the need to resort
to the later-in-time rule) to those cases in which Congress has indicated a
knowing intent to create conflict and override a treaty with a later statute.
1196 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:3
As is often the case in U.S. government, the Constitution does
not tell the whole story. Once a treaty is submitted to the Senate
for its consent, then, per Senate rules,26 “it shall be read a first
time; and no motion in respect to it shall be in order, except to
refer it to a committee [Foreign Affairs Committee], to print it in
confidence for the use of the Senate, or to remove the injunction
of secrecy.” After the Foreign Affairs Committee considers the
treaty and any potential amendments to it,27 it may then vote to
report the treaty to the floor of the Senate. The treaty may then
lie over another day before being read again and opened up to
discussion and amendment, unless the Senate unanimously con-
sents to immediate discussion.28
The resolution for a treaty vote follows the general rules for
Senate consideration of a bill, meaning that it is open for unlim-
ited debate and amendment. Amendments need not be germane,
and by continuing debate or suggesting new amendments, one
senator may postpone a ratification vote indefinitely.29 Thus, as
a basic matter, a single senator can block a treaty from reaching
the Senate floor and facing a vote on advice and consent to rati-
fication. Much Senate business is conducted by unanimous vote,
Anthony C. Infanti, United States, in TAX TREATIES AND DOMESTIC LAW 370–
372 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2006). Historically, domestic tax law in the United
States expressed an approach that generally sought to preserve treaties, but
revisions to I.R.C. § 894(a) and § 7852(d)(1) now reiterate the later-in-time view
(but with a continued commitment not to seek out conflict where it can be
avoided). Id. The United States has enacted a number of tax treaty overrides
in the past decades, including the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax
Act (I.R.C. § 897 and § 1445) and the Branch Level Interest Tax (I.R.C. § 884).
26. S. Res. 285, 113th Cong. art. XXX (revised on Jan. 24, 2013),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-113sdoc18/pdf/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf.
27. A reported treaty will often carry several amendments as a matter of
course that limit the interpretation of the treaty. One such amendment, the
Byrd-Biden condition, mandates that the treaty only be interpreted in accord-
ance with the understandings and representations made between the presi-
dent and the Senate, and a second prohibits the treaty from being enforced in
a manner that would contravene the U.S. Constitution. S. COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:
THEROLE OF THEUNITED STATES SENATE 128–31 (Comm. Print 2001). Once the
treaty is reported, it is rewritten as a resolution for ratification and, upon mo-
tion to enter into executive session, becomes the business on the floor. Id. at
137.
28. S. Res. 285.
29. Id. at 140.
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and when tax treaties are approved by the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, the Committee Chair requests unanimous con-
sent of the Senate that the full Senate move to a vote on the
agreement. Failure to achieve that consent on a move to a vote
would set in motion potentially significant delays in Senate con-
sideration of the treaty.
B. U.S. Tax Treaty Failure
In 2011 the basic Senate treaty process became the stage on
which a tax-treaty battle erupted. The story began, however, in
September 2009 when the United States and Switzerland nego-
tiated a protocol to their existing 1996 tax treaty. The protocol
sought to amend the treaty to provide for more robust exchange
of tax information between the two countries. The negotiation
itself resulted from the banking scandals of 2007 and 2008. Pur-
suant to the ratification process, the president of the United
States submitted the Swiss treaty protocol (which had been rat-
ified by the Swiss Parliament in June 2010) to the Senate in Jan-
uary 2011.30 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee then ap-
proved the protocol31 and it was reported to the full Senate on
July 26, 2011.32
As the Swiss protocol was moving through the ratification pro-
cess, Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) was elected in fall 2010 (with
the support of a group referred to as the “Tea Party”33) and took
his seat in the Senate in January 2011. In late 2011 Senator
Paul exercised a privilege to postpone the vote on the Swiss
treaty protocol. Senator Paul couched his objection to the treaty
protocol in constitutional terms. Specifically, he contended that
a citizen’s right to privacy in his or her banking data under the
Fourth Amendment would be violated by the provisions. Addi-
tionally, he asserted that disclosure of U.S. taxpayers’ financial
30. Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Swiss Confederation, Switz.-
U.S., Jan. 26, 2011, S. TREATY DOC. No. 112-1 (2011), http://www.foreign.sen-
ate.gov/imo/media/doc/treaty112-1.pdf.
31. In June 2011 the Treasury Department strongly recommended that the
Senate pass the protocol in hearings before the Senate Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee. Treaties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th
Cong. (2011) (statement of Manal Corwin, Treasury Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary).
32. Jason R. Connery et al., Current Status of U.S. Tax Treaties and Inter-
national Agreements, 42 TAXMGMT. INT’L J. 638, 641 (2013).
33. See infra note 121.
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data to Switzerland over taxpayer objections violated the due
process rights of the affected taxpayer.34 Such Senate opposition
is uncharacteristic of tax treaty ratification, which usually oc-
curs without incident.35
Senator Paul’s opposition to the tax treaty was coupled with
his opposition to a domestic legislative regime, the Foreign Ac-
count Tax Compliance Act36 (FATCA), which was enacted in
2010. He also considered this regime an unconstitutional breach
of privacy.37 The FATCA regime sought to elicit the cooperation
of foreign banks in aiding U.S. efforts to identify unreported off-
shore financial assets and accounts of U.S. taxpayers. Motivat-
ing foreign bank cooperation was FATCA’s imposition of new
withholding taxes on noncompliant foreign financial entities.
Ultimately, due to Senator Paul’s opposition, the resolution re-
garding the Swiss treaty protocol was not brought before the
Senate meeting in executive session and was returned to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the end of the 112th
Congress in January 2013.38 Senator Paul blocked subsequent
34. David Voreacos & Richard Rubin, Rand Paul Seeks to Block Tax Treaty
Change on Swiss Accounts, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 29, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-04-29/rand-paul-seeks-to-
block-tax-treaty-change-on-swiss-accounts.
35. The tax and business communities understand that tax treaties and tax
information exchange agreements are beneficial in promoting international in-
formation flows. They even recognize that information exchange can some-
times be considered in the best interests of businesses seeking to avoid nega-
tive international attention resulting from litigation, such as the case against
Union Bank of Switzerland. See Patrick Driessen, Is There a Tax Treaty Insu-
larity Complex?, 135 TAXNOTES 745 (2012).
36. In an effort to “encourage” third parties (particularly financial entities)
to share information with the United States, Congress passed domestic legis-
lation that imposes a withholding tax on investments held by foreign financial
institutions (a specially defined term) unless they have previously complied
with the new statutory requirements to provide specified financial, account,
and asset information about third parties.
37. Rand Paul, Limiting Foreign Access to Your Bank Accounts, INV.’S BUS.
DAILY (May 17, 2013), http://www.investors.com/politics/perspective/limit-for-
eign-access-to-your-bank-accounts/.
38. See, e.g., Kristen A. Parillo, U.S. Senate Committee Works to Resolve
Treaty Impasse with Rand Paul, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (July 10, 2015),
http://www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-daily/treaties/us-senate-committee-
works-resolve-treaty-impasse-rand-paul/2015/07/10/14908816; Marie Sapirie,
The Case for Optimism About Mandatory Arbitration, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY
(July 14, 2015), http://www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-daily/treaties/news-
analysis-case-optimism-about-mandatory-arbitration/2015/07/14/14912041;
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tax treaties and protocols with similar exchange of information
provisions (such as those with Luxembourg, Hungary, and
Chile) from a Senate vote.39 Business groups within and outside
the United States sought to prompt Senate action on these trea-
ties, but Senator Paul refused to negotiate with the treaty’s pro-
ponents, stating that only fundamental alterations to the infor-
mation-sharing provisions in the treaty would cause him to with-
draw his objection.40
In the event that one senator seeks to keep debate on a treaty
open and thereby delay a vote, there is a counterresponse avail-
able to other senators: “cloture.” This process may be invoked to
end debate on an advice and consent matter and bring it to a
vote. Under Senate Rule XXII, a vote of sixty senators can force
debate to end, despite filibuster efforts by other senators.41 The
motion to invoke cloture requires the bill called into question to
be treated as the sole business on the floor, subject to an addi-
tional thirty hours of further debate.42 Although no senator may
speak for more than one hour, and any further proposed amend-
ments must be germane, the Senate may not conduct any other
business during that time.43 If, on the other hand, cloture is not
invoked and the resolution of ratification is not approved before
the end of the Congressional session, then the treaty or protocol
is returned to Senate Foreign Relations Committee (i.e., the
Swiss protocol in January 2013), and the process must begin
again as if no proceedings had taken place.44 The time commit-
ment required for cloture means that if a senator makes a con-
vincing threat that he or she will object to a request for unani-
mous consent to bring a treaty to full Senate vote, then the Sen-
ate may be unlikely to press for discussion and vote.
Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Swiss Confederation, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/112th-congress/00001 (last visited
July 31, 2016).
39. Voreacos & Rubin, supra note 34.
40. Patrick Temple-West, Senator Paul Stirs Business Ire Over Blocking of
Tax Treaties, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 28, 2013), http://articles.chicagotrib-
une.com/2013-04-28/business/chi-rand-paul-tax-treaties-20130428_1_treaties-
senator-rand-paul-fatca.
41. S. Res. 285, 113th Cong. art. XXII (revised on Jan. 24, 2013),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-113sdoc18/pdf/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. art. XXX.
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Further insight into the implications of the Senate procedural
rules is gleaned as a result of another failed effort to secure rat-
ification of pending tax treaties in spring 2014. On April 1, 2014,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved five tax trea-
ties or protocols.45 Later, on May 7, 2014, Senator Paul sent a
letter to the Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid expressing his
disapproval of the exchange-of-information provisions in the
treaties. He argued that the new terms might facilitate imple-
mentation of the FATCA rules.46 Senator Paul further stated: “I
will object to any unanimous consent request, motion, or waiver
of any rule in relation to these treaties or any related measure.”47
Despite this renewed commitment by Senator Paul (and perhaps
frustrated by the multiyear delay in tax treaty approvals), on
May 22, 2014, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
Robert Menendez decided to ask for unanimous consent that the
full Senate move to a vote on the Swiss treaty protocol. Senator
Paul, as promised, objected to the action.48 It was subsequently
reported that during a June 19, 2014 hearing on tax treaties,
ChairmanMenendez reflected on the practical impact of Senator
Paul’s refusal to allow by unanimous consent a treaty vote:
The problem is that we have to bring up each treaty individu-
ally on the floor with full time for debate when these treaties
used to go by unanimous consent . . . . It’s going to be very dif-
ficult to get time on the Senate floor to go through an elaborate
process of a debate.49
That is, for the Senate to counter Senator Paul’s veto with clo-
ture, the Senate had to be willing to commit significant time and
resources.50 Given the limits on Senate time and the competing
business on its calendar, cloture was unlikely:
45. See S. REP. NO. 114-78, at 7 (2015).
46. Letter from Rand Paul, U.S. Senator, to Harry Reid, Senate Majority
Leader (May 7, 2014), reprinted in Tax Treaties Violate Taxpayer Privacy,
WORLDWIDETAXDAILY (May 9, 2014), http://www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-
daily/legislative-tax-issues/tax-treaties-violate-taxpayer-privacy-us-senator-
says/2014/05/09/218986.
47. Id.
48. Alison Bennett, Paul Blocks Effort by Foreign Relations Chief to Move
Ratification of U.S.-Swiss Treaty, DAILY TAX REP., May 27, 2014, at G-2.
49. See, e.g., Drew Singer, Sen. Menendez Predicts Slow Progress on Tax
Treaties, LAW360 (June 20, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/549776/sen-
menendez-predicts-slow-progress-on-tax-treaties.
50. Given the rules, Senator Paul could force the Senate to consider each
treaty or protocol separately, leading to nearly a month of floor time before all
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Considering the time frame left before the Senate having to
deal with appropriation process to make sure the fiscal year is
fully appropriated for, issues of current events that happen
across the globe that sometimes rivet our attention—like Iraq,
where many of our members are on the floor talking about
what the U.S. should do—and nominations for both judges and
ambassadorships, it is going to be very difficult to get time on
the Senate floor to go through the elaborate process of a de-
bate.51
Thus, although a single senator’s power to block legislation may
seem adequately counterbalanced by the option of cloture, the
practical realities of pursuing cloture limit its effectiveness. Tax
treaties, which apply only to cross-border taxpayers, were un-
likely to have been a priority issue for most U.S. voters.52 When
the treaties were sent back to the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, other more controversial matters and treaties occupied
the forefront of foreign policy discussions, most notably the U.N.
Arms Trade Treaty and the conflict in Syria.53
Despite the absence of support for cloture, key government
bodies attempted to persuade Senator Paul to drop his opposi-
tion. The U.S. State Department strongly criticized Senator
Paul’s refusal to negotiate on the treaty. With the United States
being a major proponent of expanded information exchange and
the government negotiating agreements with several govern-
ments, both under the umbrella of FATCA and as stand-alone
treaties, the inability of the United States to meet its own com-
mitments due to the treaties’ stalling in the Senate weakened its
bargaining position.54 While ratification has been pending, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has continued to use existing tax
treaties to support requests for taxpayer information from the
treaties currently stalled could be passed. See S. COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:
THEROLE OF THEUNITED STATES SENATE 142–43 (Comm. Print 2001).
51. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 49.
52. See Driessen, supra note 35.
53. Paul Eckert et al., John Kerry to Sign U.N. Arms Treaty: Diplomats,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.huffing-
tonpost.com/2013/09/24/john-kerry-un-arms-treaty_n_3983318.html.
54. See Voreacos & Rubin, supra note 34.
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Swiss government. But, approval of the expanded tax treaty pro-
tocol would improve the ability of the IRS to request infor-
mation.55
Beyond the government, business groups also lobbied Senator
Paul in an attempt to get him to drop his hold on the vote. Lob-
bying groups for U.S. businesses (including the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and the National Foreign Trade Council)56 stressed
the historic role of tax treaties, noting that treaties promote in-
ternational investment by allowing companies to operate over-
seas free from fear of double taxation and by facilitating smooth
dispute resolution between taxpayers and various tax jurisdic-
tions. Moreover, although the Swiss protocol and other stalled
tax treaties included information exchange provisions, their rat-
ification was supported by the business community. Exchange-
of-information provisions are valuable to businesses that are
seeking an alternative to the burdensome FATCA withholding
tax regime. Under FATCA, withholding can be avoided if foreign
governments and financial institutions allow exchange of infor-
mation (but that possibility can depend on the treaty in place).57
Foreign businesses also expressed support for the tax treaties
by lobbying together under the Organization for International
Investment.58 Foreign businesses generally support tax treaties
55. See Kristen A. Parillo & Marie Sapirie, IRS Submits Treaty Request to
Switzerland on Credit Suisse Data, 136 TAX NOTES 770 (2012),
http://www.capdale.com/files/7393_ARTICLE%20IRS%20Submits%20Treaty
%20Request%20to%20Switzerland%20on%20Credit%20Suisse%20Data.pdf.
56. See, e.g., Letter from Information Technology Industry Council, Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers, National Foreign Trade Council, Organi-
zation for International Investment, Software Finance & Tax Executives Coun-
cil, TechAmerica, Trans-Atlantic Business Council, U.S Chamber of Com-
merce, United States Council for International Business, to Bob Corker, U.S.
Senator (July 11, 2013) [hereinafter Letter to Senator Corker],
http://www.ofii.org/sites/default/files/Tax%20Treaty%20Coalition%20Let-
ter%20July%202013.pdf (regarding the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
and the need to approve the pending tax protocols and treaties).
57. See Automatic Response: The Way to Make Exchange of Tax Information
Work, ECONOMIST (Feb. 16, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/special-re-
port/21571561-way-make-exchange-tax-information-work-automatic-re-
sponse.
58. See Temple-West, supra note 40.
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in order to avoid excessive taxation and discriminatory treat-
ment by foreign governments,59 but foreign companies and fi-
nancial institutions are also aware of mounting U.S. pressure to
release financial information to tax authorities. For example, in
late 2011 (the same year Senator Paul first blocked the treaties)
ten Swiss banks acceded to U.S. pressure to provide client finan-
cial information in order to avoid the publicity associated with
prosecution in U.S. courts.60 It is likely that businesses are eager
to see ratification of the treaty in order to facilitate solutions
that bypass public investigations, to update rules and proce-
dures, and to coordinate emerging tax-reporting obligations.
The appeals by business groups to Senator Paul and libertar-
ian organizations, such as the Cato Institute, have failed to gain
traction. Senator Paul’s opposition focuses on the information-
sharing provisions of the treaties, which he claims violate indi-
viduals’ privacy rights in their banking records. He contends
that his position defends individual rights from infringement by
big government and big business, a stance lauded by the Cato
Institute. The business community has been unable to convince
Senator Paul that the benefits of the tax treaty outweigh his ex-
pressed concerns for individual rights.61 Offering additional
grounds for objecting to the treaties, the Cato Institute has ques-
tioned the confidentiality of information obtained by tax author-
ities, suggesting it may be leaked or misappropriated by foreign
regimes.62 Ironically, the traditionally noncontroversial nature
of double taxation treaties may now be impeding ratification.
Senator Paul’s move has not drawn widespread general media
attention because tax treaties have not been a matter of much
debate and have generally been approved without objection after
referral to the Senate for a vote.63 The average individual tax-
payer is unlikely to be impacted by either ratification or nonrat-
ification of the Swiss treaty protocol (at least in the short term).
59. See Org. for Int’l Inv., The Purpose and Scope of U.S. Tax Treaties,
OFII.ORG, http://www.ofii.org/sites/default/files/docs/Back-
ground_on_Tax_Treaties.pdf (last visited July 31, 2016).
60. Randall Jackson, Swiss Banks Turn Over Encrypted Data to U.S. Offi-
cials, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.taxnotes.com/world-
wide-tax-daily/2012-02-01.
61. See Temple-West, supra note 40.
62. Richard W. Rahn, Rise of the Global Tax Collectors, CATO INST. (July 9,
2012), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/rise-global-tax-collectors.
63. See Driessen, supra note 35.
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Thus, private individuals have not been active in convincing
Senator Paul to change his position.
Paradoxically, the Cato Institute has framed its opposition to
tax treaty information exchange as part of its pro-business
stance, despite support for tax treaties from prominent business
groups. Cato Institute fellows argue that international efforts to
“plug holes” in the tax base, such as information sharing and
formulary apportionment, allow countries to manipulate their
tax codes to maximize the income taxable under their respective
regimes.64 If higher-tax countries are able to reach assets in
lower-tax jurisdictions (by virtue of more effective information
sharing), lower-tax jurisdictions will lose their incentive to keep
rates low, and the resulting rise in rates will subsequently im-
pede foreign investment by multinationals.65
In early summer 2015 Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman Bob Corker conferred with Senator Paul in an at-
tempt to move several pending tax treaties toward ratification.66
In commenting to reporters, Corker acknowledged that the com-
mittee appreciated the importance of resolving the issue, but
that he “couldn’t give an exact deadline” on the discussion.67 Ob-
servers remained skeptical that the issue would be resolved ex-
peditiously.68
Days after Corker’s statement, Senator Paul showed that he
would not back down. In July 201569 he filed a lawsuit challeng-
ing the constitutionality of FATCA.70 Senator Paul and six other
64. See, e.g., Daniel J. Mitchell, OECD Scheme to Boost Taxes on Business
Sector Will Hurt Global Economy and Enable Bigger Government, CATO INST.
(June 9, 2015), http://www.cato.org/blog/oecd-scheme-boost-taxes-business-
sector-will-hurt-global-economy-enable-bigger-government.
65. Daniel Mitchell, OECD Launches New Effort to Undermine Tax Compe-
tition, CATO INST. TAX & BUDGET BULL. (Mar. 2013),
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tbb_68.pdf.
66. Parillo, supra note 38. On July 9, 2015, Corker indicated that in the six
weeks of prior discussion between Senator Paul and the committee staff the
two sides did not address any potential solutions discussed by the parties.
67. Id.
68. See Kristen A. Parillo,U.S. and Vietnam Sign Tax Treaty, 79 TAXNOTES
INT’L 110 (2015).
69. Crawford v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 2015 WL 5697552, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 29, 2015).
70. SeeWilliam R. Davis & Andrew Velarde, Sen. Paul Files Lawsuit Chal-
lenging FATCA, 79 TAXNOTES INT’L 110 (2015); Senator Rand Paul to Sue IRS,
U.S. Treasury, WASH. TIMES (June 24, 2015), http://www.washington-
times.com/news/2015/jun/24/sen-rand-paul-sue-irs-us-treasury/.
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plaintiffs argued that “FATCA eschews the privacy rights en-
shrined in the Bill of Rights in favor of efficiency and compliance
by requiring institutions to report citizens’ account information
to the IRS even when the IRS has no reason to suspect that a
particular taxpayer is violating the tax laws.”71 The petition
sought to strike several key provisions of FATCA, contending
they infringe upon the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution.72 Additionally, the plaintiffs filed for a
preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of FATCA and foreign
bank reporting.73
On September 29, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of Ohio denied the request for a preliminary injunc-
tion, finding that the parties lacked standing and, thus, likely
would be unsuccessful on the merits.74 The District Court also
reasoned that the U.S. Constitution does not recognize a right to
privacy in bank records.75 The court further commented that the
public had an interest in continued enforcement of the disclosure
provisions at issue due to the importance of encouraging tax
compliance and combatting tax evasion.76
From the time Senator Paul entered the Senate and objected
to the Swiss protocol (and all subsequent tax treaties and proto-
cols that contained exchange-of-information language) through
November 2015, a total of nine U.S. tax treaties and protocols
were blocked from moving through the Senate (ranging from the
2009 proposed protocol to the Luxembourg-U.S. treaty to the
2015 proposed Vietnam-U.S. treaty).77
71. See, e.g., Davis & Velarde, supra note 70; see also Sapirie, supra note 39
(quoting former U.S. Treasury International Tax Counsel, H. David Rosen-
bloom).
72. Id.
73. Crawford, 2015 WL 5697552.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. The pending treaties include: (1) a proposed protocol to the 1996 Lux-
embourg-U.S. treaty, signed in 2009; (2) a proposed protocol to the 1996 Swit-
zerland-U.S. treaty, signed in 2009; (3) a proposed new Hungary-U.S. treaty,
signed in 2010; (4) a proposed new Chile-U.S. treaty, signed in 2010; (5) a pro-
posed protocol to the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative As-
sistance in Tax Matters, signed in 2010; (6) a proposed protocol to the 1990
Spain-U.S. treaty, signed in 2013; (7) a proposed new Poland-U.S. treaty,
signed in 2013; (8) a proposed protocol to the 2003 Japan-U.S. treaty, signed
in 2013; and, (9) a proposed Vietnam-U.S. treaty, signed in 2015. See Parillo,
supra note 38.
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Signs of a possible breakthrough came in November 2015
when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee gave its approval
of eight pending treaties and protocols (Chile, Hungary, Japan,
Luxembourg, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, and the Multilateral
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Mat-
ters).78 Prior to the vote on October 29, 2015, the U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary (International Tax Affairs) Robert Stack
spoke at a hearing held by the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee.79 Stack argued that the tax treaties needed to be ap-
proved in order to protect U.S. multinationals from double taxa-
tion, to respond to tax evasion and maintain U.S. credibility, and
to establish the United States as a leader in international taxa-
tion.80 Although these observations were not new (and busi-
nesses had been lobbying Senator Paul to retract his objec-
tions),81 commentators considered Stack’s remarks at this hear-
ing a precursor that set the stage for the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee’s decision to approve the treaties and move
them on to the Senate for advice and consent.82 Observers, how-
ever, still questioned whether Senator Paul, who had not an-
nounced a change in his position, would seek to filibuster the
agreements if and when they were brought to the full Senate for
a vote.83 As of the date of this publication, there has been no fur-
ther movement on the tax treaties. In April 2016, however, the
78. See, e.g., Patricia Zengerle, Senate Panel Approves Eight International
Tax Treaties, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
tax-treaties-idUSKCN0SZ1YD20151110.
79. Treaties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Foreign Relations, 114th
Cong. (2015) (opening statement of Robert B. Stack, Treasury Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary (International Tax Affairs)), http://www.foreign.sen-
ate.gov/imo/media/doc/102915_Stack_Testimony.pdf.
80. Id.
81. See Temple-West, supra note 40; The Ratification of Income Tax Treaties
and Protocols: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Foreign Relations, 113th Cong.,
(2014) (statement of Catherine Schultz, Vice President for Tax Policy, National
Foreign Trade Council), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/me-
dia/doc/Schultz_Testimony.pdf.
82. See generally Ryan Finley, Pending Tax Treaties Clear U.S. Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 11, 2015),
http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/treaties/pending-tax-treaties-clear-
senate-foreign-relations-committee/2015/11/11/17748591.
83. Ryan Finley & William Hoke, Tax Treaty Instruments Awaiting U.S.
Senate Vote Face Uncertain Future, TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/treaties/pending-tax-treaties-clear-
senate-foreign-relations-committee/2015/11/11/17748591.
2016] When International Agreements Fail At Home 1207
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed
Senator Paul’s case challenging FATCA and related infor-
mation-sharing measures for lack of jurisdiction.84
II. DOMESTIC POLITICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS—A
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Although the U.S. experience with a single senator’s efforts to
stop tax treaties may be interesting, it becomes useful when set
against the larger backdrop of international relations theory.
The story provides a valuable way to distill more general ques-
tions, concerns, and observations from this specific example. Ul-
timately, a more in-depth examination of international relations
theory will be needed to generate a comprehensive picture of
when and why international tax agreements fail or succeed at
home. But, for purposes of this article, gaining a preliminary un-
derstanding of key features of international relations theory is
appropriate.
A. International Relations Theory—an Overview
A predominant focus of the rich international relations litera-
ture is explaining and predicting why, when, and how nations
cooperate. Before examining the theoretical place of domestic
politics in international relations and the analysis of coopera-
tion, it is essential to have an overview of international relations
theory and its work on cooperation. Historically, two major the-
oretical traditions have shaped the analysis of international co-
operative behavior: neorealism and neoliberalism.85 Typically,
neorealism has emphasized four key elements:
(1) the state as the central (and rational) actor in the interna-
tional arena; (2) the state’s desire to achieve relative gains over
other states (thus the attention to the balance of power); (3) the
84. Crawford v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 2016 WL 1642968, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 25, 2016).
85. See, e.g., JAMES E. DOUGHERTY & ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR.,
CONTENDING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE
SURVEY 68–69 (5th ed. 2001); Ring, supra note 14, at 91–110; Shah M. Tarzi,
The Role of Principles, Norms, and Regimes in World Affairs, 15 INT’L J. ON
WORLD PEACE , no. 4, 1998, at 5 (“Neorealism and neoliberalism, the two lead-
ing contending interpretations in international politics, incorporate broad con-
ceptions of international order and the organization of the international sys-
tem.”).
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importance of survival of the state in what is an anarchical in-
ternational society; and (4) the importance of structure in
terms of the relationship among units of the international sys-
tem (that is, the power dynamics).86
In short, neorealists see “power” (i.e., securing, maintaining, or
lacking power) as the motivation for the decisions, conduct, and
relations witnessed in the global environment.87
86. Ring, supra note 14, at 91; see also ARTHUR STEIN, WHY NATIONS
COOPERATE 4–7 (1990) (defining realism); Andrew T. Guzman, International
Law: A Compliance Based Theory 18 (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Pub. Law and
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 47, 2001), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=260257 (characterizing neorealism as “an outgrowth of classical real-
ism, [which] treats states as unitary actors and the relevant unit in interna-
tional relations . . . [where] the interests of states are believed to be power and
security, and power is considered to be the primary influence on international
behavior.”). Neorealism has been described as a theory that draws strong par-
allels to rational choice theory in microeconomics:
Just as in microeconomic theory, the rational-choice assump-
tion of profit maximization makes it unnecessary to know or
even to speculate about the management of a specific firm in
the neorealist view, explaining international outcomes does
not require any functional differentiation among states or
any insight into their particular characteristics. Nor is there
any need, from the neorealist perspective, to factor non-state,
trans-state, or sub-state actors into a causal account of inter-
national outcomes, which is a refinement of some classical
realists’ openness to incorporating domestic politics or influ-
ential leaders into causal stories. Finally, a neorealist be-
lieves it is unnecessary to consider that a state might seek
something other than interest defined in terms of power, just
as microeconomists do not account for the possibility that a
firm might seek to maximize something other than profit, for
instance, the happiness of its constituent employees.
Thomas H. Lee, International Relations Theories and International Law 4
(Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No.
2606223, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2606223.
87. See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 86, at 4–7 (addressing the importance of the
balance of power and power dynamics between and among states); Ring, supra
note 14, at 93 (comparing neorealism and neoliberalism); Walter Carlsnaes,
Foreign Policy, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONALRELATIONS 307 (Walter Carls-
naes, Thomas Risse, & Beth A. Simmons eds., 2d ed. 2013); Lee, supra note 86,
at 4 (contending that “on the neorealist view of world politics, international
outcomes are wholly explained by differences in the power possessed by the
interacting state units.”); JOYCEP. KAUFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
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Neoliberalism similarly presumes that the state is the primary
actor in international relationships but considers the “state’s
pursuit of national self-interest in a market-oriented model as a
dominant factor in shaping international relations and in deter-
mining how successful international institutions can be in di-
recting and modifying international behaviors.”88 While it does
not reject a role for power, neoliberalism finds more explanatory
value in viewing state action as predicated on the pursuit of na-
tional self-interest in a world in which information and monitor-
ing costs can block the pursuit of mutually beneficial goals. This
neoliberal picture essentially characterizes international agree-
ments as the response to, or intervention in, cases of “market
failure.”89 Under this vision of international relations, achieve-
ment of absolute gains (for example, where both states are better
off) is a more important goal, and the achievement of relative
gains is a less important one.
In summary, these two dominant theoretical strands offer di-
vergent stories on international cooperation—neorealism con-
tends that states pursue relative advantage (i.e., a good outcome
is one that secures relative gains measured in comparison to the
other states involved), whereas neoliberalism anticipates that
RELATIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 45 (2013) (noting that “the structure of the
international system and the distribution of power within it become determin-
ing factors in the ways in which states behave.”).
88. Ring, supra note 14, at 91; see alsoKAUFMAN, supra note 87 (stating that
neoliberalism “plac[es] greater emphasis on the role that nonstate actors play
in understanding international relations” although neoliberalism “start[s]
with the assumption of the state as a unitary actor that will act in its own best
interest.”). Another refinement of the power argument in neorealism is found
in the vision that neoliberalism appreciates that “soft power is an increasingly
important source of power” and that “different actors,” not just “different coun-
tries,” are important in the international relations. SeeMiaMahmudur Rahim,
Who’s Who: Transnational Corporations and Nation States Interface Over the
Theoretical Shift into Their Relationship, 4 AFR. J. POL. SCI. & INT’L REL. 195,
196 (2010).
89. See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 86, at 7–8 (stating that neoliberalism typi-
cally views regimes, i.e., cooperation, as the response of states in their effort to
overcome interstate “market failure”); see also Ring, supra note 14, at 91–93;
Michael Tomz, International Finance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 698–700 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, & Beth A. Simmons
eds., 2d ed. 2013) (reviewing the impact of the market failure-based paradigm
in international relations theory); KAUFMAN, supra note 87, at 51 (observing
that “even in an international system without a single central authority, states
will work together cooperatively because it is in their best interests to do so.”).
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states seek absolute gains (arrangements that make both states
better off).90 Eventually, these two dominant perspectives were
augmented by two developments in international relations the-
ory: pluralism and cognitivism.
Advocates of pluralism encouraged both neorealists and ne-
oliberalists to pay more attention to the role of nonstate actors
in the path and shape of international relations. The pluralist
approach does not reject the importance of the state. Rather, plu-
ralism views the virtually exclusive focus on the nation-state as
shielding from view other major forces on international rela-
tions: individual actors, bureaucracies, nongovernmental agen-
cies, businesses, etc.91
The other notable development, cognitivism,92 emerged from
the postmodern international relations literature and the
broader work of constructivism.93 Cognitivism serves more as a
critique of existing theories than an independent paradigm for
international relations. The major complaint of cognitivists is
that other theories fail to question the “origins” of states’ identi-
ties, goals, and knowledge. Given the centrality of such
knowledge in shaping the course of international relations, at-
tention should be directed to how knowledge is developed, con-
trolled, and transmitted.94 More precisely, cognitivism is a chal-
lenge to the implicit rationale underlying the other theories by
90. See, e.g., Ring, supra note 14, at 91.
91. See, e.g., DOUGHERTY&PFALTZGRAFF, supra note 85, at 28–34; Peter Wil-
letts, Transnational Actors and International Organizations in Global Politics,
in THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 326–45 (John Baylis, Steve Smith, & Patricia Ow-
ens eds., 5th ed. 2011); see also Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism,
80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1159 (2007) (criticizing international law scholars for
“emphasizing formal state-to-state relations” and for paying little attention to
pluralist literature).
92. Ultimately, cognitivism can be seen as a dimension of the broad post-
modern concept of constructivism, where cognitivism is the branch looking at
knowledge formation and the development and movement of ideas. See, e.g.,
DOUGHERTY&PFALTZGRAFF, supra note 85, at 166–68.
93. See, e.g., id. at 38–40.
94. See, e.g., ANDREASHASENCLEVER, PETERMAYER, & VOLKER RITTBERGER,
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 136 (1997). See generally RICHARD
ECCLESTON, THEDYNAMICS OFGLOBALGOVERNANCE: THEFINANCIALCRISIS, THE
OECD, AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION 45–50 (2012).
See also Stephan Haggard & Beth A. Simmons, Theories of International Re-
gimes, 41 INT’LORG. 491, 499 (1987) (offering a comparison between functional
theories, which “see regimes as more or less efficient responses to fixed needs”
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underscoring the “pervasive ambiguity of reality and conse-
quently emphasiz[ing] factors such as perception, knowledge,
and ideology”95 in shaping the choices made by states.
Despite the effort in this article to concisely capture the core
dimensions of international relations theory, it cannot be em-
phasized strongly enough that the literature is infinitely more
complicated, overlapping, and detailed than what has been de-
scribed. For example, at certain points in time, and in some con-
texts, dividing lines blur, and the works of neorealism and ne-
oliberalism become nearly indistinguishable. Further complicat-
ing any neat theoretical story are the myriad variations on all of
the above theoretical camps and categories, as well as other
strands not addressed here. The size of the literature (and liter-
ally the books) seeking to encapsulate international relations
theory signals the unwieldy nature of any such endeavor. These
caveats, however, are not meant to dissuade the reader from the
task at hand. The goal is not to tame international relations the-
ory. Rather, the aim is to ascertain the essential parameters of
international relations analysis and then determine how to in-
corporate the “complication” of domestic politics into the picture.
Before proceeding to a consideration of domestic politics, one
final facet of international relations theory must be introduced:
regime theory. Regime theory is generally viewed as the dimen-
sion of international relations theory most specifically focused
on the creation, maintenance, and demise of “regimes”96—i.e.,
and cognitive theories, which “see them as conditioned by ideology and consen-
sual knowledge and evolving as actors learn.”).
95. Peter Mayer et al., Regime Theory: State of the Art and Perspectives, in
REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 409 (Volker Rittberger ed.,
1993). For a basic overview of cognitivism, see Ring, supra note 14, at 110–12.
96. A commonly used definition of regimes has been offered by Stephen
Krasner, who has described regimes as
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations con-
verge in a given area of international relations. Principles are
beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards
of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules
are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-
making procedures are prevailing practices for making and
implementing collective choice.
Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as In-
tervening Variables, 36 INT’LORG 185, 186 (1982). For examples of reliance on
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the cooperative dimension of international relations. Despite the
moniker, regime theory is not a “single theory.” Rather, regime
theory operates with the expectation that there are multiple ex-
planatory variables in regime formation. Thus, it draws upon
the major strands (neorealism and neoliberalism) along with the
refinements and perspectives encouraged by pluralism and con-
structivism (including cognitivism).97
Models of regime formation grounded in neorealism would
view regimes and the specific shapes they take as a function of
the power-based positions of the parties. Given the centrality of
power to this view, the game theory models typically employed
by neorealists would differ from those utilized by neoliberal-
ists—even where the cooperation in question could potentially
also be viewed as a response to market failure (the hallmark ex-
planation of regime formation according to neoliberalism). Thus,
for example, “whether one views international tax conflicts as
the result of market failure (for example, uncertainty, infor-
mation needs, and transaction costs) or not, may have a direct
bearing on the applicability of neorealist vs. neoliberal regime
the Krasner definition, see Virginia Haufler, Crossing the Boundary Between
Public and Private: International Regimes and Non-State Actors, in REGIME
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 96–97 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993);
Robert O. Keohane, The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a Euro-
pean-America Research Programme, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, 23, 26–27 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993); TERENCE C. HALLIDAY &
GREGORY SHAFFER, TRANSNATIONAL LEGALORDERS 16 (2015) (noting Krasner’s
“consensus definition of ‘regimes’”); see also HASENCLEVER, MAYER, &
RITTBERGER, supra note 94, at 8–9. Refinements of Krasner’s definition include
some attention to the effectiveness of the regime and compliance, even where
such compliance is inconvenient for a state. SeeKeohane, supra note 96, at 27–
28, 33.
97. See, e.g., Mayer et al., supra note 95, at 413 (stating that scholars envi-
sion regime theory grounded in multiple variables whose relevance and relia-
bility as predictive tools will depend on the context of cooperation); ECCLESTON,
supra note 94, at 40–50 (reviewing the contributions of neorealism, neoliberal-
ism, cognitivism, and the role of non-state actors such as the OECD and the
IMF). Peter Hass identified four regime-based patterns: (1) neorealist “follow-
the-the leader,” (2) institutionalism/neoliberalism with bargaining, (3) “follow-
the-leader with the influence of epistemic (i.e., knowledge) communities, and
(4) bargaining with the influence of epistemic communities. Peter M. Haas,
Epistemic Communities and the Dynamics of International Co-operation, in
REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 180–90 (Volker Rittberger ed.,
1993).
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theories.”98 It seems quite plausible that certain issues in inter-
national tax may be more aptly characterized as being driven by
power (meriting neorealist-based regime analyses and its corre-
sponding game theory models), whereas other issues would be
described better as reflecting market failure (and warranting a
neoliberalist regime theory approach and the game theory mod-
els most reflective of market failure dynamics).
B. Two-Level Game Theory with Domestic Politics
The above section offers a high-level overview of the dominant
elements of international relations theory and, in particular, its
focus on cooperation. Scholars, commentators, and observers,
however, have recognized that any effort to fully understand in-
ternational relations must incorporate the pressures, steps, and
influences from the domestic sphere. For example, cognitivists
have critiqued neorealism and neoliberalism for their lack of at-
tention to the power and potential role of the domestic arena.
A more comprehensive effort to integrate a state’s domestic
processes into the study of international relations, however,
came in a 1998 article,99 which framed the dynamic as a two-
level game. This approach, advocated by Robert Putman,
emerged as an influential way to model the dynamics between
domestic politics and international relations. The core insight of
the game is that a state engaged in international negotiations is
not only engaged in a game on the global level (which is compa-
rable to the game theory models noted above and employed by
neorealists and neoliberals seeking to explain cooperation or the
lack thereof). A state engaged in international negotiations is
simultaneously playing a game at the domestic level. One
scholar, Joel Trachtman, offers a vivid picture of the tension cre-
ated by being a player in both games:
Putnam’s two-level game theory suggest[s] that the role of the
national government in international relations is to mediate
between two separate “games,” the international game and the
98. Ring, supra note 14, at 113.
99. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-
Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988); see also Ahmer Tarar, Constituencies
and Preferences in International Bargaining, 49 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 383
(2005) (noting the “seminal” status of Putnam’s article); Kenneth Schultz, Do-
mestic Politics and International Relations, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 480–81 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, & Beth A. Simmons eds.,
2d ed. 2013).
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domestic game: “The unusual complexity of this two-level game
is that moves that are rational for a player at one board (such
as raising energy prices, conceding territory, or limiting auto
imports) may be impolitic for that same player at the other
board.”100
The key is to arrive at a deal that is successful on both levels,
especially if domestic ratification or implementation of some
type is required in addition to the formal international agree-
ment.101 Variations on this two-game model consider, for exam-
ple, how different ratification requirements,102 veto power,103 or
underlying government forms affect the game.104
The two-level game perspective can help preview the problem
of cooperation versus commitment. “Successful” international
relationships seek cooperation between international actors
(typically states) symbolized by an “agreement.” But cooperation
at the outset has limited value unless accompanied by a credible
commitment to comply with the agreement, as reflected in the
100. Joel P. Trachtman, International Law and Domestic Political Coalitions:
The Grand Theory of Compliance with International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L.
127, 153 (2011).
101. The quest for domestic legitimacy has been characterized as not merely
a “political fact,” but also “a reason within a normative order.” Richard Bellamy
& Albert Weale, Political Legitimacy and European Monetary Union: Con-
tracts, Constitutionalism and the Normative Logic of Two-Level Games, 22 J.
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 257, 264 (2015).
102. See Tarar, supra note 99, at 292–93; Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosen-
dorff, A Model of the Two-Level Game, in INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
INFORMATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 67 (1997).
103. See, e.g., Edward D. Mansfield et al., Free to Trade: Democracies, Autoc-
racies, and International Trade, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 308–10 (2000);
Christian Adam et al., It’s Not Always About Winning: Domestic Politics and
Legal Success in EU Annulment Litigation, 53 J. COMMONMKT. STUD. 185, 191
(2015) (noting that “where legal disputes affect domestic reform issues in which
national governments that are seeking reform encounter strong opposition
from effective veto players, negative rulings challenging the legality of existing
domestic arrangements can be used as a normative lever in domestic bargain-
ing processes.”). Veto power can be understood to encompass far more than
literal veto power within the political structure of a jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jobst
Heitzig & Ottmar Edenhofer, Cap, Insure & Compensate: Domestic Policies
and the Ratification of International Environmental Agreements 3 (Apr. 26,
2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256875 (noting the
power of various kinds of veto players such as the fossil fuel energy industry).
104. See, e.g., Mansfield et al., supra note 103, at 308–10; Robert Pahre, En-
dogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Over-
sight of the European Union, 41 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 147 (1997).
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parties’ behavior over time.105 Domestic politics is relevant both
in determining the creation and content of an agreement and in
shaping the degree of state compliance in practice. The precise
effect of domestic politics may vary. For example, success at the
outset (creation of the agreement) may enhance the likelihood of
compliance in the long-term through the mechanism of domestic
politics.106 But, in other cases, subsequent pressures from do-
mestic politics can constrain compliance and, thus, commit-
ment.107
III. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND THEDOMESTIC
SIDE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOME INITIAL
OBSERVATIONS
Building on the existing theoretical framework for interna-
tional relations outlined in Part II, this Part explores the ways
in which such theory can provide a more sophisticated under-
standing of international tax cooperation. The case study of U.S.
tax treaty negotiation offers an opportunity to test the explana-
tory powers of the various dimensions of international relations
theory, in particular the two-level game theory view that recog-
nizes the importance of the domestic level in international coop-
eration.
A. International Relations and Domestic Action
As we begin to unravel the events and forces at work in the
U.S. tax treaty ratification story, the theoretical frames detailed
above provide valuable insight. For example, in applying neore-
alist theory to the domestic realm, power remains at the fore-
105. See, e.g., Bellamy & Weale, supra note 101, at 263 (contending that
states must satisfy two conditions related to their games: “First an interna-
tional agreement requires ‘fair dealing’ among states . . . [s]econd, states must
ensure the general acceptability of the agreement to their respective peoples
and be able to justify their international commitments.”).
106. See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009) (making this observation
based on an example from the human rights context); HELEN V. MILNER,
RESISTING PROTECTIONISM: GLOBAL INDUSTRIES AND THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONALRELATIONS (1988) (offering an example from the trade context).
See generally Schultz, supra note 99.
107. See, e.g., B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal Design of
International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 INT’L ORG. 829,
832–35 (2001).
1216 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:3
front of consideration, and the state is the centerpiece of the ac-
tion. Thus, a key question in thinking about the transition from
negotiating a U.S. tax treaty to final implementation is the
power of the state not just vis-à-vis other states (as discussed in
the general consideration of international relations and regime
theory) but vis-à-vis the public and “organized” interest
groups.108 A “strong” state is one that is able to effectively pursue
“national policy” (including securing resources and exercising
global power on behalf of the nation) unconstrained by domestic
politics. Inherent in some of these formulations is the sense that
domestic forces are an intrusion with the potential to derail oth-
erwise desirable state power and policy.109 The power model
seems to require less contemplation of state interests and state
goals (and perhaps places less value on domestic forces) because
the end game is acquiring power and preserving sovereignty and
autonomy.
The neoliberal tradition—which envisions the global arena as
one in which states pursue cooperative behavior to manage in-
formational uncertainties due to market failure—pays more at-
tention to which interests the state ultimately pursues. In that
regard, domestic forces become a more central part of the ac-
count rather than a distraction from the state’s business at
hand. All the players (i.e., political leaders, agencies, and inter-
est groups) are expected to have “interests,” and the question
becomes how the multitude of interests coalesce into a national
position pursued by the state at the global level.
In the case of U.S. tax treaties, which of these two dominant
visions of international relations theory might be more persua-
sive in grounding our understanding of the dynamics? A power-
based story, which focuses on the relative positioning of coun-
tries, may offer insight into the support for Senator Paul’s ob-
struction of the treaty process in the Senate. In contrast, the
support of U.S. tax treaties from the business community sug-
gests that they perceive the situation as one in which interna-
tional agreement provides an efficient solution to certain tax co-
ordination issues—a view more consistent with neoliberalism.
For example, a letter from multiple business and trade groups
urging approval of the blocked treaties argued: “Tax treaties
108. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 99; Michael Mastanduno et al., Toward a
Realist Theory of State Action, 33 INT’L STUD. Q. 457 (1989); see also infra text
accompanying notes 117–118.
109. Schultz, supra note 99 (observing this feature in the realist tradition).
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help the U.S. economy by allowing U.S. companies to more effi-
ciently conduct their businesses abroad and by making the U.S.
more hospitable to foreign investment, which creates and sus-
tains millions of American jobs.”110 The difficulty in isolating a
dominant vision of international relations in this context may
reflect the fact that the debate over the treaties taking place at
the domestic level involves a disagreement over what values
should drive U.S. tax policy-making power or efficiency.
Moreover, the constructivist branch of postmodern interna-
tional relations theory from which cognitivism emerged111 not
only rejects the idea that the goals of the state are clear (argua-
bly a view supported by neorealists) but also challenges the ne-
oliberalist suggestion that domestic politics is merely the venue
in which the state’s positions are formed in the face of competing
interests (such as those espoused by Senator Paul and by the
opposing business and trade groups) and interest groups. Ra-
ther, the constructivists believe that more can, and does, take
place in the domestic sphere—national identity can be shaped
and reshaped here.112 Such identity or vision developed and
shared at the domestic level can then have a lasting impact on
110. See Letter to Senator Corker, supra note 56.
111. See supra text accompanying note 92.
112. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 99. Scholars seeking to place constructiv-
ism in a broader context offer an overview explanation:
Constructivist scholars reject the dominant assumption of
contemporary I[nternational] R[elations] theory that the in-
terests of states and other actors are formed prior to social
interaction. Instead, constructivists claim that identity for-
mation is relational and occurs before, or at least concur-
rently with, interest formation. Interests are therefore de-
fined both in material and non-material terms. While ac-
knowledging the importance of power and material interests,
constructivists focus attention upon the role that culture,
ideas, institutions, discourse, and social norms play in shap-
ing identity and influencing behaviour. For this reason, con-
structivist thought is especially compelling when seeking to
explain the constitution of actors, institutions and social
structures, and their change over considerable periods of
time. (Citations omitted)
Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Constructivism and International Law, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 119 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013).
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state decisions internationally. In the context of the recent U.S.
treaty negotiations, an in-depth study would consider the origins
of the political rift that resulted in the government negotiating
agreements that generated some objection at home. An initial
reaction may emphasize the one-off nature of the objections (a
single senator), the confluence of a single objecting senator and
the intricacies of Senate rules of operation, or the growing do-
mestic political tension about international cooperation. But too
much attention to any single explanatory factor may belie the
complicated formation of U.S. tax policy. For example, given the
frequent characterization of modern U.S. national politics as be-
ing driven by big business and big donors, why has Senator Paul
been unmoved for many years by the entreaties of the business
community that has sought ratification of U.S. treaties? Was the
time-consuming cloture technique (for challenging Senator
Paul) the only realistic option for other senators who supported
the negotiated treaties?
Although the two dominant theoretical threads (neorealism,
neoliberalism) and the two refinements (pluralism and cogni-
tivism) differ when applied to domestic politics, there is, none-
theless, a shared conceptual acknowledgement that at some
point a state presents itself on the global stage as capable of
making agreements. The precise mechanism varies from state to
state but always involves the emergence of one individual, or a
group of individuals, with the political authority to make deci-
sions on the behalf of the state. It is for this reason that we can
speak of domestic politics and international relations as two dis-
tinct but highly intertwined spaces.113 As others have noted, the
two spheres interact through the mechanism of “influencing”
these key decision makers. The potential for influence is prem-
ised on the assumption that these decision makers wish to retain
power and status and that their ability to do so depends in part
on the acquiescence of others. But, in the process of unraveling
the story behind how the decision makers respond to competing
goals, claims, and values, the theories diverge, with some em-
phasizing a “competitive” marketplace of views on international
policies in which the most influential domestic groups prevail.114
Others portray decision makers as players who internalize
113. See generally Schultz, supra note 99, at 480–81.
114. Id. at 480–502.
2016] When International Agreements Fail At Home 1219
emerging norms and identities or alternatively as actors who
stake out their own paths first and are only disciplined later.115
B. Game Theory and Integration of the International and
Domestic Spheres
The primary tools and concepts of international relations
study, including neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism,
were developed in the context of state-to-state relations. When
the analysis sought to incorporate the domestic level into the
state-to-state frame, the theory needed more—the two-level
game model. The model does not replace the ideas of neorealism,
neoliberalism, or constructivism. Rather, it shapes the context
in which those explanatory frames are explored.
1. Institutional and Structural Features
A dominant starting point for inquiry into the two-level game
view of domestic politics and international relations is the insti-
tutional structure delineating the actions and powers of the do-
mestic players. The ability of the domestic actors to block com-
pletion of an international agreement clearly signals the exist-
ence of the two-level game. Perhaps the most significant aspect
of the treaty two-level game is the institutional structure pre-
scribing the relationship between the executive and legislative
branches.
As a formal matter, the executive (the Treasury Department
performs this function for tax) negotiates at the global level in
anticipation of satisfying the Senate in the second game
(through “advice and consent”). Historically, this resulting two-
level game, played sequentially, has progressed predictably.116
115. Id.
116. The two levels may typically be sequential as a formal matter, with
states negotiating their agreement, which then would be ratified through in-
ternal domestic processes. Given established treaty practice (including the
U.S. Model Tax treaty and the OECD Model Tax treaty), little risk generally
would be anticipated at the second (i.e., domestic) level. It should be noted,
though, that in 1995 Senators Bob Dole and Jesse Helms blocked ratification
of tax treaties until President Clinton compromised on another unrelated bill.
This situation, which differed from the current U.S. treaty blockage in that
there was no underlying objection to the tax treaties themselves, emerged after
the Senate failed to vote on the State Department Reorganization and Author-
ization Act. As retaliation, Senate Majority Leader Dole coordinated with Sen-
ator Helms, the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to block all
tax treaties until the White House acquiesced. A month later, Senator Helms
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With the baseline of the U.S. Model Tax treaty and the similar
OECD Model treaty, the United States regularly negotiates
treaties with other countries with the expectation that the re-
sulting agreement will be ratified domestically in the United
States. Thus, tax agreements have been sufficiently consistent
and stable to create a presumption that tax treaties and proto-
cols will face no actual challenge in the second level of the game,
despite the Senate’s formal power.
The U.S. case study of tax treaty blockages involving Senator
Paul, the Swiss protocol, and a stalled ratification process turns
not just on the institutional structure of the executive and legis-
lation branches delineated in the U.S. Constitution but also on
the rules and procedures adopted by the Senate. In the floor vote
on the Swiss protocol, Senator Paul had a single vote. But under
the current Senate rules he can block a bill unless, and until,
others in the Senate invoke cloture. Once Senator Paul blocked
the bill, why did others not pursue cloture? Committee Chair-
man Menendez’s June 2014 statement clearly confirms that the
combination of insufficient Senate resources to counter Senator
Paul and the existence of other items on the Senate’s calendar
led him to believe that cloture was unrealistic. The Senate would
have needed to view the standoff as sufficiently serious to put
aside other business and pursue the cloture process, not just on
the Swiss protocol but on the other tax treaties and protocols as
well.
released seven tax treaties as a show of “good faith,” though he continued to
delay meetings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, effectively holding
up all foreign policy legislation requiring Senate approval. See John Godfrey,
Dole, Helms Hold U.S. Tax Treaties Hostage, 11 TAX NOTES INT’L 420 (1995).
Perhaps reflecting both the general ease with which tax treaties passed Con-
gress and the lack of any noted objection to the terms of the tax treaties, the
business community missed the initial signs of trouble in this 1995 tax treaty
hold up:
As of August 4 [three days after the cloture vote failed] most
members of the Senate Finance Committee, many industry
representatives, and ranking White House and Treasury of-
ficials said they had no knowledge of the impasse. A Foreign
Relations Committee aide had no explanation, but an indus-
try lobbyist said most affected by the treaties have simply as-
sumed they will pass and have therefore not paid much at-
tention.
Id.
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Whether a failure to progress on treaty ratifications generates
the level of political interest sufficient to motivate other senators
to table pressing matters and pursue cloture depends in part on
the structure of the U.S. government as a presidential democ-
racy. In a presidential democracy such as the United States, the
popular election of the president occurs independently of the
election of members of Congress. Members of Congress are
elected individually, and their party affiliations and political
perspectives can differ from that of the president, especially in
the case of members of Congress who are elected in the middle
of a presidential term. As a result, legislators may not be in-
clined to vote in a manner consistent with the goals of the cur-
rent executive.117 The gap between the executive branch (in this
case the Treasury and the president) and members of the Senate
can be difficult to curb in the presidential system. When com-
bined with the procedural power of individual senators, the re-
sult is a stalled protocol.118 Despite the importance of tax infor-
mation sharing and the public discussion of individual tax evad-
ers and multinationals engaged in tax avoidance, the Senate cal-
endar has been occupied by other pressing debates.
The problem can be more generally stated as a challenge faced
by democracies with potentially strong veto players. In a paper
by Betz and Hanif considering the two-level game and India’s
domestic and foreign energy policy, the authors observed that
the core of the two-level game imposes on governments the need
to “reconcile” the competing domestic and international forces in
an effort to establish and implement policy.119 But this task is
complicated in a democracy:
117. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 99, at 492 (“Presidential democracies are
more likely than parliamentary democracies to produce legislatures in which
the median voter has different preferences from the executive.”).
118. In the context of the 1995 treaty blockage, the impasse was clearly un-
derstood as a direct battle between the policy goals of the executive branch and
the goals of some senators in the opposing political party. See, e.g., Godfrey,
supra note 116 (“Senate Finance Trade Subcommittee Chair Charles E. Grass-
ley, R- Iowa, said he knew of Helms’s decision and fully supported it. The pres-
ident has decided to block Republican efforts to reorganize the State Depart-
ment, so he can pay the consequences.”).
119. Joachim Betz & Melanie Hanif, The Formation of Preferences in Two-
level Games: An Analysis of India’s Domestic and Foreign Energy Policy 6 (Ger.
Inst. of Glob. and Area Studies, Working Paper No. 142, 2010), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670627.
1222 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:3
Domestic power polarity, that is, the government’s domination
of society vis a vis societal groups and forces, is obviously less
favorable for the government in democracies and federal sys-
tems, particularly when the interplay of governmental and
electoral systems tends to produce fragmented parliaments
and executives.120
A significant gap does not always exist between the executive
branch and the legislature, but when it does, the reality of two
levels of the international tax relations “game” becomes pro-
foundly apparent.
2. Changing Political Forces
A related and important part of the U.S. treaty story involved
a changing political landscape, which can occur faster on an in-
dividual state level than on the presidential/executive branch
level. In 2009 and 2010 the Tea Party rose to relative promi-
nence in the United States.121 Perhaps best characterized as a
decentralized movement coalescing around a mix of socially con-
servative and “small government” views (reduction of the na-
tional debt, decreased national spending, and reduction in
taxes), the Tea Party supported Rand Paul when he won his Sen-
ate seat in 2010. During his time in the Senate, Senator Paul
has continued to espouse what he has described as “libertarian”
views.122 To date, however, Senator Paul’s statements, actions,
and ideologies have created domestic discord. The combination
of Senator Paul’s decision to block the treaty protocol and the
gap that exists between his political views (including what could
be described as his principles regarding the relationship be-
tween the government and taxpayers) and those of the executive
branch (and much of the Senate) have all contributed to the dis-
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Tea Party: Evolution of a Revolt, WASH. POST, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-srv/metro/teaparty (last visited Aug. 2, 2016); Timeline:
The Tea Party’s Path to Power, CNN POLITICS,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/10/25/tea.party.timeline/index.html (last
visited Aug. 2, 2016); About Us, TEAPARTY.ORG, http://www.teaparty.org/about-
us/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
122. See, e.g., Dr. Rand Paul, the Son of Texas Republican Rep. Ron Paul,
Told CNNMonday that He is Seriously Considering a Run for the Senate, CNN
POLITICAL TICKER (May 4, 2009), http://political-
ticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/05/04/im-very-serious-about-running-ron-pauls-
son-says/.
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cord. This discord has produced tangible consequences: with re-
spect to the Swiss protocol, the United States reached an agree-
ment on tax policy goals and specific information exchange lan-
guage with Switzerland, but has failed to achieve the necessary
acceptance at home.
Although Senator Paul’s immediate constituency in Kentucky
may support his more libertarian Tea Party position on infor-
mation exchange (to the extent they have considered it), he has
faced growing pressure, even from the business community, to
change his stance. For example, major U.S. business lobbies,
such as the Chamber of Commerce and the National Foreign
Trade Council, have reiterated their support for treaty ratifica-
tion as being crucial to smooth business relations.123 If and when
the combination of business pressure and/or the pursuance of
cloture becomes sufficiently powerful to pressure Senator Paul
to change his stance, this domestic barrier to international
agreement could be resolved.
There may be a perception that, although tax treaty matters
are important, they are not as crucial as a peace treaty, nor as
high profile as some other matters (i.e., certain trade agree-
ments or immigration reform). The United States’ inability to
ratify the protocols and treaties, however, has generated its own
source of momentum for change. As Senator Paul continues to
block treaties, the number of treaties stuck in the pipeline has
grown. The failure to vote and approve the treaties thus has im-
pacted countries, businesses, and other parties as well.
For that reason, perhaps some viewed the November 2015
movement on tax treaties as promising.124 But the treaties have
not been brought to the Senate for vote as of the date of this
publication. The political influence of the libertarian base does
not seem to be rapidly growing such that the executive branch
would be likely to shift its position on exchange of information
in the near future, nor is Senator Paul losing his voter support.
The key to bridging the gap will be interest groups working
against the landscape of the Senate rules. What may have been
merely a “delay” at the end of 2011 looks considerably more like
123. See, e.g., Letter from Troy K. Lewis, Chair, Tax Exec. Comm., to Bob
Corker, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, & Robert Menen-
dez, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.aicpa.org/advocacy/cpaadvocate/2015/pages/senate-tax-treaty-let-
ter.aspx.
124. See supra notes 78–83.
1224 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:3
a serious block to ratification in 2016. Even among interest
groups that have always supported ratification, time delay may
intensify and solidify their interest in breaking the jam. Finally,
it is worth noting that, even if the treaties move successfully
through the Senate process in 2016, the block would have lasted
approximately five years and would represent a serious example
of international agreements “failing at home.”
3. Iterative Dynamic Between Domestic Politics and Inter-
national Cooperation
Not only does the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stand-
off impact those seeking relief under the blocked treaties, the
failure to achieve agreement at the domestic level of the game
could also impact subsequent U.S. efforts at tax treaty negotia-
tions. Negotiating states have two dominant concerns: coopera-
tion (can we reach a deal) and commitment (will the other party
cheat, back out, or fail to respect the deal). The block on U.S. tax
treaties renders the first concern paramount—at least where
there has been no ratification and entry into force of a U.S. tax
treaty over a period of years. Of course, nations may proceed to
negotiate with the United States with expectations that the
blockage in the Senate will be resolved in the near future and
any resulting agreement will be in line for ratification. But, as
time progresses without resolution, other states are faced with
a choice—should resources be devoted to negotiating a deal with
the United States if it is unlikely to be ratified? Finally, there is
a risk that diminished credibility, due to the United States’ in-
capacity to execute and then ratify a tax deal, will impair the
power and influence that the United States can bring to these
deals and will constrain its ability to “encourage” countries to
engage in negotiation and information exchange.125
125. The United States’ new unilateral domestic legislation requiring infor-
mation disclosure to the U.S. tax authorities by third parties (the FATCA re-
gime) may have mitigated the negative effects of failed tax treaty ratification.
Other countries now have an independent reason to negotiate with the United
States regarding information exchange practices. FATCA, however, is not en-
tirely divorced from the treaty process. For example, the Swiss still need the
protocol to the Switzerland-U.S. treaty to be ratified in order to fully effectuate
their FATCA agreement with the United States. See Temple-West, supra note
40; Sandy Fitzgerald, Rand Paul Not Backing Down on Tax Treaty Fight,
NEWSMAX (May 5, 2013, 4:13 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/rand-
paul-tax-treaty/2013/05/05/id/502854/.
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C. Summary Observations
Although the story of recent treaty blockage in the United
States is specific to one country and one domestic failure, it,
nonetheless, illuminates a number of valuable takeaways: (1)
identifying risk junctures in the domestic side of international
agreement requires examination of domestic procedural rules
and realistic practices and not just the constitutional or formal
roles of the actors; (2) domestic barriers can arise even when the
majority of domestic participants support the international
agreement; (3) business lobbies can be more limited in their suc-
cess than might be anticipated in the absence of strong counter
lobbies; and (4) domestic stalemate does not necessarily deter
subsequent negotiating efforts by other countries, at least to the
degree that might be expected.
One question that arises in contemplating the case study is
whether countries can find work-arounds when a barrier be-
comes entrenched. The answer seems to be yes, in some cases.126
With regard to bilateral tax treaties and their protocols, a direct
work-around has not been possible—these tax treaties have such
an established role in the international tax framework that
there seemingly has been no movement since 2011 to broadly
replace the agreements with something not susceptible to hold
up in the Senate.
In a related area, however, the Treasury introduced a new
form of international tax agreement that it has executed with
126. An unintentional example of self-help or work-arounds could be the
treaty-based portions of the BEPS project. In a recent BEPS article, which con-
tends that the BEPS project has adopted the practices and structure of inter-
national finance law for developing and reaching global agreement, Itai Grin-
berg makes a separate argument regarding when and which BEPS commit-
ments will be successful. He argues that the success of BEPS will vary depend-
ing on whether a particular issue is one that concerns bilateral treaties or in-
stead concerns another area of international tax law. Specifically, Grinberg ob-
serves that the BEPS commitments that are implemented through the OECD
Model treaty effectively will be reflected in most existing bilateral tax treaties
without further action by the states (due to the relationship among the Model
Treaty, bilateral treaties, and judicial interpretation). Thus, the game becomes
a one-level game, and once the first game is completed (i.e., the international
agreement, here represented by the BEPS Reports and related material), there
is no second game that must be played to effectuate compliance. Grinberg, su-
pra note 7, at 35–47.
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many treaty parties. These new agreements, called Intergovern-
mental Agreements (“IGAs”),127 have been viewed by some com-
mentators as an end run-around the tax treaty process. These
agreements were negotiated with treaty parties in an effort to
create a smoother mechanism by which foreign financial institu-
tions could satisfy the expectations of the new FATCA regime128
(the same regime that Senator Paul sued to bar enforcement).
The United States took the position (though some commentators
disagreed) that the treaty approval process was inapplicable to
IGAs because they were executive agreements.129
In terms of international relations analysis, IGAs can be
viewed as evidence of the interactive nature of the two-level
game. In cases where agreement at the international level could
be reached but the agreement would encounter significant do-
mestic barriers, the state level negotiators might revisit the ar-
rangement and explore structures and options more likely to
survive the second level of the game.
Finally, consideration of the U.S. treaty case against the back-
drop of expanding international agreements from BEPS raises
an additional complexity. What strategies and nuances do the
multilateral aspects of BEPS bring to a two-level game analysis?
Of course, the two levels (domestic and international) have cer-
tainly included multiple players at the international level when
the game has taken place in nontax fields. For example, in trade
negotiations, multilateral international agreements are com-
mon, thus, the first level game would include multiple jurisdic-
tions. Historically, however, tax treaties have been bilateral
127. See, e.g., Additional FATCA Documents, TREASURY.GOV,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA-
Archive.aspx (last visited Aug. 2, 2016); FATCA Information for Governments,
IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/FATCA-Governments
(last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
128. See, e.g., Press Release, Statement of Mutual Cooperation and Under-
standing Between the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Authorities of
Japan to Improve International Tax Compliance and to Facilitate Implemen-
tation of FATCA (June 11, 2013), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-cen-
ter/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Statement-Japan-6-11-2013.pdf
(“FATCA has raised a number of issues, including that Japanese financial in-
stitutions may not be able to comply with certain aspects of FATCA due to
domestic legal impediments; [w]hereas, intergovernmental cooperation to fa-
cilitate FATCA implementation would address these issues and reduce bur-
dens for Japanese financial institutions.”).
129. See, e.g., Allison Christians, Interpretation or Override? Introducing the
Hybrid Tax Agreement, 80 TAXNOTES INT’L 51 (2015).
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(and the agreements that have stalled in the U.S. Senate are
bilateral). But, the BEPS project incorporates a range of agree-
ment structures, including multilateral commitment to the
BEPS final reports, possible commitment to a multilateral
treaty, and implications for bilateral treaties. Analysis of the un-
derlying negotiation dynamics raises the prospect that jurisdic-
tions might make a broad multilateral, international commit-
ment at the first level but at the second (domestic) level of the
game implement this global agreement very differently on a
country-by-country basis.130
CONCLUSION
One might imagine that at the close of this analysis we could
reasonably conclude that domestic politics is a bit of a “problem,”
a hindrance to achieving the business of promoting and pursuing
the state’s interest (arguably neorealism’s unstated view). Cer-
tainly, the BEPS project, with its completion of the final reports
in 2015, could characterize a state’s inability to follow through
with commitments in the BEPS final package as a “problem” cre-
ated by domestic politics. Following that line of reasoning, per-
haps the problem is democracy itself. But that conclusion moves
too fast.
Facilitating global cooperation is not the sole national goal of
a democracy. Other “goods” result from the democratic process.
Moreover, the neoliberal view that “unencumbered” state execu-
tives do not inherently pursue “ideal” national policy under-
mines any quick labeling of the democratic process as a hin-
drance. Perhaps a better national position can emerge from a
public debate among interest groups with competing substantive
positions. Finally, although democracies (especially ones unable
to control the domestic game) can have difficulty signaling their
ability to successfully negotiate an agreement, nondemocracies
may have a challenge of their own in credibly committing to a
stable outcome over time. Thus, an appreciation for the power of
domestic politics to shape international tax agreements is not a
call for significant constraints on democracy. But it does demand
that we understand when, how, and why domestic politics “in-
trude” on international agreements. Additionally, it requires
that we consider how specific features of a domestic system con-
tribute to the democratic process and to related goals that we
130. See Grinberg, supra note 7.
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identify. A more sophisticated appreciation of all of these rela-
tionships can help anticipate likely outcomes of an agreement,
determine when and whether early intervention on the domestic
front is appropriate, and assess whether any elements of the do-
mestic institutional infrastructure should be reevaluated in
light of their impact on the business of the legislature and the
executive branch in the pursuit of international cooperation.
